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Introduction 
The ability to consider others’ perspectives is essential for human social 
interaction and communication. Under the banner of research on “theory of mind”, 
developmental psychologists have conducted hundreds of investigations of the time 
course, causes and consequences of children’s developing understanding of mental 
concepts such as belief, perception, desire, and intention from infancy into early 
childhood (e.g., Doherty, 2008; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, Bíró, 1995; Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Woodward, 1998). Recent years 
have also seen a burgeoning literature investigating the cognitive and neural basis of 
theory of mind in adult participants (e.g., Apperly, 2013, for a recent review). Among 
the most striking findings in this research is that healthy adults, who have a clear 
grasp of mental concepts, nonetheless show egocentric effects on many theory of 
mind tasks, observed either as a slowing of responses when judging someone whose 
perspective differs from their own (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & 
Bodley Scott, 2010), or as a complete failure to take that perspective into account 
when responding (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Keysar, Lin, & 
Barr, 2003). These results from adults show that traditional approaches to the 
development of theory of mind significantly underestimate the task that they face. A 
full account of development must not only explain the successful acquisition of theory 
of mind concepts by young children. They must also account for how older children 
become able to use these abilities effectively in fast-moving social interactions, and 
ultimately explain how development arrives at the imperfect abilities observed in 
adults. The present research built upon one of the few studies that charted the 
extended development of one theory of mind ability – the use of a speaker’s visual 
perspective to interpret what they say. Our pilot study with healthy adults revealed a 
	   3	  
clear egocentric tendency in eye movements when their communicative partner 
uttered complex sentences, but not when she uttered simple sentences (Wang, Cane, 
Ferguson, Frisson, & Apperly, in prep). This suggests that the complexity of the 
speaker’s language, which has to be integrated with information about her visual 
perspective, affects adults’ ability to fully consider her perspective. Here we 
investigate how children aged 8 and 10 years are affected by the complexity of the 
language, and ask whether improvements in coping with such demands account for 
age-related reduction in egocentrism.  
Before going further, a note on our terminology: the primary focus of the 
literature on children’s “theory of mind” has been on children’s acquisition of mental 
concepts. When these concepts are used to understand that another person sees or 
thinks something different from one’s self, the difference between self and other is a 
difference in “perspective” (not a difference in “theory of mind”). When this 
information is used to guide communication with the other person, we will describe 
this as “perspective-use”, which is a particular instance of “theory of mind” use.  
To carry out a successful conversation, speakers and listeners must both refer 
to information shared between them (Clark, 1992; Clark & Marshall, 1981). For 
example, if a friend from school asks you to meet her at the bus stop, it is reasonable 
for you to assume that she is referring to the bus stop at the school gate, and not the 
bus stop near her house, with which you have no experience. An efficient speaker 
takes into account the information known and unknown to her listener. By the same 
token, listeners can infer which bus stop the speaker is referring to, by drawing upon 
their common experience of using the same bus stop at the school gate. Speakers and 
listeners must be able to consider each other’s perspectives and use this information 
online so that their conversation does not fall apart. 
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Despite the intuition that human beings are good communicators, studies 
suggest that even adults frequently struggle to account for their communicative 
partner’s perspective by fixating or selecting objects only available to themselves 
(e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2003). Clearly healthy adults do not lack the 
conceptual understanding that their communicative partner may hold a limited 
perspective. Nonetheless, the high proportion of egocentric errors – that is, incorrectly 
selecting the referent that best fits one’s own perspective rather than that of the 
speaker – observed in adults suggests that having a conceptual understanding of 
others’ perspective does not guarantee successful use of perspectival information in 
online communications (Apperly et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2003). Moreover, there is 
evidence that individual differences in neurotypical adults’ rates of success at using 
perspective information online are related to traits associated with both autism and 
psychosis (Abu-Akel, Wood, Hansen, & Apperly, 2015), suggesting that these 
laboratory tasks may be valid tools for investigating processes that impact on real-
world social abilities. 
Evidence suggests that children are more egocentric than adults in both 
language production (Deutsch & Pechmann, 1982; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002) and 
language comprehension (Dumontheil, Blakemore, & Apperly, 2010; Epley, 
Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004). Although sensitivity to a communicative partner’s 
perspective emerges as early as 3 to 5 years of age (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Nilsen & 
Graham, 2009), there is a continuous reduction of egocentric errors on 
communication tasks between age 7 and 17 years (Dumontheil et al., 2010). That a 
continuous improvement is seen after the age at which children pass conceptual tests 
of visual perspective (Moll & Tomasello, 2006) and theory of mind (Wellman et al., 
2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) suggests that the improvement is likely driven by an 
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advancing ability to use perspectival information rather than acquiring further 
understanding of others’ perspectives.  
Importantly, we know little about which factors make it more or less difficult 
for older children at any age to use perspective information successfully, and what 
factors account for age-related improvement. The only direct evidence on factors 
affecting children’s use of perspective information comes from Nilsen and Graham 
(2009), who found that higher rates of egocentric errors were associated with poorer 
inhibitory control. Similar trends were observed for measures of working memory 
though these effects did not reach significance. These results converge with evidence 
from adults that rates of egocentric errors are higher in individuals with lower 
working memory scores, and can be increased under concurrent memory load (Lin, 
Keysar, & Epley, 2010). However, while breaking new ground these studies leave a 
number of important points unclear. Firstly, while they highlight cognitive factors 
within the child that may contribute to performance, these studies do not identify what 
factors in communicative situations tax those cognitive factors. Direct manipulation 
of factors embedded in communication is needed to reveal the way in which 
inhibitory control and working memory might be key constraints. Secondly, these 
studies leave it unclear whether egocentric errors arise from difficulty with taking the 
speaker’s perspective, or from difficulty with integrating the speaker’s perspective 
with her speech. Barr (2008) suggests that even before a speaker refers to an object, 
adult listeners’ eye movements indicate that they anticipate referents to come from the 
common ground, not privileged ground. For adults, at least, this suggests that listeners 
have little difficulty calculating the speaker’s perspective, and indeed have done so 
prior the point at which this information can be used. In contrast, Barr (2008) suggests 
that integrating this perspective information with the speaker’s message in order to 
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resolve reference is relatively difficult and prone to interference from listener’s 
egocentric point of view (see Wu, Barr, Gann, & Keysar, 2013, for supporting 
evidence). It cannot be assumed that children will calculate perspectives as readily as 
adults, and so distinguishing between possible sources of difficulty in perspective 
calculation or perspective use is important for understanding when and why children 
might make egocentric errors in natural communication. Finally, while these studies 
are compatible with increasing executive capacity being responsible for age-related 
increases in the successful use of perspective information during communication, they 
provide no direct evidence on this developmental change. In the present work we 
sought to address the first two of these questions by varying the complexity of the 
language with which the speaker’s perspective must be integrated, and the final 
question by examining whether effects of this manipulation decrease with age. 
Our approach was based on pilot work with adult participants showing 
egocentric tendencies in eye-movements varied according to the complexity of the 
speaker’s instructions (e.g., “nudge the small ball” versus “nudge the small ball one 
slot up”, Wang et al., in prep). In the former case, listeners could focus on reference 
resolution as soon as the referent-noun became available, while in the latter case this 
demand was combined with the requirement to continue to listen to an instruction 
about where to move the target item. This effect of sentence complexity illustrates 
one way in which executive capacity might be critical for successful performance, not 
for perspective-taking per se, but for enabling integration of perspective with 
language.  
Based on these results from adults, we expected both 8- and 10-year-olds to 
perform more egocentrically when presented with complex sentences compared to 
simple sentences. Secondly, based on previous research by Dumontheil et al. (2010) 
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we expected younger children to perform more egocentrically than older children. 
Finally, if the manipulation of sentence complexity also taps into a developmental 
factor that enables older children to be less egocentric than younger children, then we 
should observe an interaction between the factors of age and sentence complexity, 
whereby older children are less affected by sentence complexity than younger 
children.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-nine 8-year-olds (mean age 7;9, age range 7;3 to 8;9, 16 females) and 
56 10-year-olds (mean age 9;9, age range 9;2 to 10;10, 24 females) from a primary 
school located in a working-class region of Birmingham took part in the study. 
Twenty-two 8-year-olds took part in the low sentence complexity condition, 17 took 
part in the high sentence complexity condition. There was no difference between the 
ages of the children assigned to the two conditions (p = .656). Twenty-eight 10-year-
olds took part in the low sentence complexity condition; another 28 took part in the 
high sentence complexity condition. There was no difference between the ages of the 
children assigned to the two conditions (p = .892). An additional 11 8-year-olds and 1 
10-year-old were excluded prior the analysis due to failing to pass a critical question 
that acted as the inclusion criterion (described in the Design and procedure section).  
 
Design and procedure 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design was constructed with trial (experimental, control) as 
a within-participant factor, sentence complexity (low sentence complexity, high 
sentence complexity) and age (8 years, 10 years) as between-participant factors. 
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Children were tested individually in a quiet area outside of their classrooms. The 
experimenter (author M.A.) instructed children using a PowerPoint presentation on a 
17” laptop. During an instruction phase, children were invited to play a game where 
they would have to follow a director Sally’s instruction to move objects around on a 
shelf. Children were first shown an example of an instruction, and a demonstration of 
how to select and move an object by using a computer mouse to “drag and drop” the 
object. The experimenter then drew children’s attention to the blocked slots, and 
explained that Sally cannot see the objects in the blocked slots because she is standing 
on the other side of the shelf. Children were then shown an image of the back of the 
shelf to demonstrate Sally’s limited perspective. This was followed by five check 
questions in which the experimenter asked children whether Sally could see certain 
objects. Objects from both the open and blocked slots were included in the questions 
to ensure that children fully understood Sally’s view of the shelf. If a child did not 
answer all five questions correctly, then the experimenter would repeat the 
aforementioned explanation about Sally’s limited perspective. No child required 
repeated instructions. Children were then given two example images of the shelf, 
which were each accompanied by an example of a critical instruction. While viewing 
the first shelf image, children were given an explicit example of the way in which 
Sally’s perspective constrains reference. Children were told that “If Sally asks you to 
move the small ball, you might be tempted to move this object (experimenter pointed 
to the smallest ball in child’s view), but this is an object Sally cannot see, so Sally 
can’t be talking about this object. Instead, Sally must be talking about this object, 
which she can see (experimenter pointed to the small ball from Sally’s view). 
Children were then asked to respond to an example of the critical instruction by using 
the computer mouse. Children in the low sentence complexity condition were 
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presented with audio examples of “nudge” phrases (e.g., “nudge the small ball”), 
whereas children in the high sentence complexity condition were presented with audio 
examples of “nudge-up/down/left/right” phrases (e.g., “nudge the small ball one slot 
up”). If children responded incorrectly, the experimenter would repeat the explanation 
about the way in which Sally’s view constrains reference. To help children construct a 
clear idea of Sally’s perspective, an image of the back of the shelf was once again 
shown to demonstrate Sally’s limited view of the shelf. The second example image of 
the shelf, which presented a different array of objects to the first example image, was 
designed to be an inclusion criterion, as children who understood instructions they 
were given up to this point should be able to respond correctly. Eleven 8-year-olds 
and 1 10-year-old who failed to answer this question correctly were still invited to 
carry on to a test phase, but their data were excluded prior the analysis. 
Children were then presented with two shelf-images to practice, with each 
image involving 3 instructions from Sally. The practice and test trials were presented 
with Experiment Builder (SR Research Ltd, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada). During 
the test phase, a total of 32 shelf-images were presented. Each image contained a 4 x 
4 shelf and the director Sally standing behind the shelf. Of the 16 slots on the shelf, 5 
slots were blocked from the director’s view, with a total of 8 objects on the shelf. 
When an image appeared, children had 500 ms to examine the image before hearing 2 
to 3 instructions from the director, one of which was a critical instruction. A total of 
80 instructions were presented, with 32 critical instructions. The critical instructions 
were “nudge the [scalar adjective] [noun]” in the low sentence complexity condition, 
and “nudge the [scalar adjective] [noun] one slot [directional word]” in the high 
sentence complexity condition (for a complete list of critical instructions, see 
Appendix A). The remaining 48 instructions were fillers, 16 of which contained scalar 
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adjectives, 8 contained non-scalar adjectives. All sentences were spliced together 
from individually recorded words to eliminate the use coarticulatory information for 
identification of a target prior the onset of its corresponding adjective or noun. 
Children were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. If children 
did not respond within 8500 ms, then the trial timed out, and either the next 
instruction was played or the next shelf-image shown.  
Half of the images corresponded to the experimental trials; the other half 
corresponded to the control trials. On experimental trials, the object that best fit the 
director’s description differed between the director’s point of view and the children’s 
point of view. For example, when the director asked for the “small ball”, the object 
she referred to was X in the left panel of Figure 1 as it is the smaller of the two balls 
available to her (“target” hereafter). However, the object that best-fits the director’s 
description from the children’s point of view was Y	  (“distractor” hereafter). In order 
to correctly select a target, it was essential that children utilized perspectival 
information to resolve reference. Control trials were identical to the experimental 
trials apart from that the distractor was replaced by an irrelevant object which did not 
compete with the target as a potential referent (e.g., a carton, see right panel of Figure 
1). Therefore the control trials provided an appropriate baseline measure of the 
processing cost for the non-perspective-taking aspect of the task, which included 
having to comprehend the director’s instructions and use the computer mouse to 
identify the referent object that fitted her instructions. 
Each pair of experimental and control images were presented at least 8 images 
apart from each other. Children were equally likely to see an experimental shelf-
image before its control shelf-image as they were to see the reversed order. We 
presented 8 shelf-images per test block, allowing children to take breaks between the 
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blocks. Four running versions of the experiment were generated by rotating the order 
of the blocks and by reversing the presentation order of the shelf-images. At the end 
of the test phase, children were given a participation certificate and a sticker. 
	  
Figure	  1	  Left:	  an	  example	  stimulus	  from	  an	  experimental	  trial.	  Right:	  an	  example	  stimulus	  from	  a	  
control	  trial. 
 
Results 
Percentage egocentric error 
Egocentric errors could occur on experimental trials, and were defined as 
selection of a distractor, which was an object that fits the director’s description from 
the children’s point of view but not the director’s point of view. Egocentric errors 
were not possible on control trials because an irrelevant object replaced the distractor, 
removing the demand to use the director’s perspective. However, since the rest of the 
display and the stimulus sentences were identical on the experimental and control 
trials, we considered the percentage of selection error to this irrelevant object as a 
meaningful comparison baseline. Trials containing other selection errors (8.4% in 8 
year-olds; 7.2% in 10-year-olds), response timeouts (3.0% in 8 year-olds; 1.5% in 10-
year-olds), and technical faults (3.0% in 8 year-olds; 1.6% in 10-year-olds)1 were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The experimental program was designed so that upon the detection of a mouse release, the next audio 
instruction was played. This means that if a child clicked more than once on the computer mouse, the 
X	  
Y	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excluded prior to the analysis. The percentage of errors ranged from 0% to 1.1% 
among the control trials, in contrast with the 23% to 60% among the experimental 
trials. The unequal variance between the experimental and control trials and the low 
error rate among the control trials made it questionable to include this factor in an 
omnibus analysis. Therefore we only submitted the experimental trials to a 2 x 2 
between-participant ANOVA, with sentence complexity (low sentence complexity, 
high sentence complexity) and age (8 years, 10 years) as factors2. There was a 
significant main effect of sentence complexity, F(1, 91) = 23.67, p < .0001, ηp2 = .206 
(low sentence complexity = 28.4%, high sentence complexity = 53.0%), and a 
significant main effect of age, F(1, 91) = 6.10, p = .015, ηp2 = .063 (8 years = 46.9%, 
10 years = 34.4%). The interaction between sentence complexity and age was not 
significant, F < 1, see Figure 2. This suggests that children of both age groups were 
more egocentric when presented with complex sentences compared to simple 
sentences. The egocentric tendency was found to decrease with age, which adds 
support to the findings from Dumontheil et al. (2010). However, 10-year-olds were 
equally affected by the complexity of the director’s utterances as their 8-year-old 
counterparts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
instruction following the twice-clicked instruction would be played prematurely. We excluded these 
trials as the onset of the instructions were likely to be unexpected by the participating child. 
2 The pattern observed here in the 2 x 2 ANOVA holds for analysis of overall errors when we included 
trial (experimental, control) as a factor in a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA. 
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Figure	  2	  Percentage	  egocentric	  errors	  on	  experimental	  trials.	  Error	  bars	  correspond	  to	  one	  standard	  
error.	  
  
Response time 
The high error rates among the experimental trials meant that it was common 
for a child’s mean response time for a given condition to be comprised of few data 
points. The implication is that the response time data could not be interpreted with 
confidence, as the results were likely to be inflated by the variance induced by 
insufficient data points. For transparency, we report the descriptive statistics in 
Appendix B. 
 
General Discussion 
Consistent with previous research, clear egocentric effects were observed in 
errors (e.g., Dumontheil et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2003; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). 
Also consistent with previous work (Dumontheil et al., 2010) the present study 
showed that 10-year-olds committed fewer egocentric errors than 8-year-olds. This 
result underscores an important point that is frequently overlooked in studies of 
theory of mind abilities with a narrow focus on preschool children: Although the 
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conceptual understanding of visual perspective and other aspects of theory of mind 
develops by 5 years of age (Moll & Tomasello, 2006; Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983), the ability to use information about other’s perspective has a much 
more protracted developmental course, with egocentric biases and errors observed 
even in adults (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Birch & Bloom, 2007; Mitchell et al., 1996; 
Royzman et al., 2003).  
One key objective in the present study was to examine how children are 
affected by the complexity of the instructions with which they must integrate the 
speaker’s perspective. We found that both 8- and 10-year-olds made more egocentric 
errors when the speaker’s utterance was more complex (e.g., “nudge the small ball 
one slot up”) compared with when it was simple (e.g., “nudge the small ball”). This 
highlights an important new performance factor that is likely to contribute to variation 
in the success of children’s everyday use of perspective information. It is noteworthy 
that in comparison with conversational discourse, neither type of instruction was 
particularly long or complicated, and the difference between them was relatively 
small. Thus, it is likely that the current results underestimate the variance in 
successful use of perspective that results from variation in sentence complexity in 
natural discourse. Finally, we note that the additional sentence complexity occurred 
after the critical adjectival noun phrase with which the director’s perspective must be 
integrated (“small ball” in the above example), at a point when participants had 
already had considerable time to calculate the speaker’s perspective3. This suggests 
that the resulting increase in egocentric errors arose from increased difficulty with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is unlikely that participants struggled to calculate the speaker’s perspective within the time given. 
Nadig and Sedivy (2002) showed that children age 5 to 6 years spontaneously distinguish what is and 
is not visible to a speaker before the speaker has completely delivered the noun phrase. Furthermore, if 
children in the current study were unable to calculate the speaker’s perspective in time to resolve 
reference, then performance should be at floor level, especially when the critical instruction was the 
first instruction of the set. Both age groups performed significantly above floor level even when the 
critical instruction came first, ts > 9.98, ps < .0001.  
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integrating language and perspective, rather than with calculating the director’s 
perspective. Altogether these results fit well with previous evidence suggesting that 
the rates of egocentric errors in children and adults are related to individual 
differences in executive function (e.g., Lin et al., 2010; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). It 
seems plausible that such resources are needed to meet the demands of integrating 
perspective with language, and that language complexity is a critical factor that 
determines whether an individual’s resources will be sufficient for success in a given 
instance. 
Our second key objective was to seek evidence on what drives age-related 
reduction in egocentrism. Previous work has found correlations between egocentric 
errors on the director task and children’s inhibitory control (Nilsen & Graham 2009), 
and adults’ working memory spans (Lin et al., 2010), and the present work found that 
children made more egocentric errors when the director’s instructions were more 
complex. These results suggest plausible candidates for drivers of developmental 
improvements in egocentrism, but provide no direct evidence. One contribution of the 
present investigation is to operationalize a way to address this question for research 
on perspective-taking and theory of mind performance in children: Direct evidence 
would come from finding a factor that affects the rate of egocentric errors less in older 
children than it does in younger children. In the present study we were able to ask this 
question by testing for an interaction between age and the effect of language 
complexity on children’s egocentric errors. We found no such interaction, suggesting 
that the age-related reduction in egocentric errors observed was not due to an age-
related improvement in children’s capacity to meet the demands of integrating 
information about the speaker’s message with constraints from her perspective.  
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The present study compared 8- and 10-year-old children, and although we 
observed a significant effect of both age and language complexity, it is quite possible 
that we would also have observed an interaction between age and a manipulation of 
language complexity if the comparison were made over a larger age range. However, 
it is informative to view the current findings in the context of other studies that have 
reported analogous results from other paradigms. For example, Surtees and Apperly 
(2012) found no interaction between age and the relative difficulty of judging 
someone else’s visual perspective that was either congruent or incongruent with one’s 
own between 6 and 10 years of age. Similarly, Apperly et al. (2011) found no 
interaction between age and the relative difficulty of predicting how someone will act 
on the basis of a true versus a false belief between 6 and 11 years of age. Taken 
together these results suggest that we cannot take for granted that factors affecting 
children’s perspective-taking and other theory of mind abilities at a given age are the 
same factors responsible for age-related improvements. As suggested by Apperly 
(2010), it is possible that in addition to requirements on working memory and other 
executive functions, a further reason for older children being less egocentric than 
younger children might be age-related improvements in basic speed of processing. 
Even when a child has the competence in principle to take someone’s perspective, if 
she cannot draw upon this information sufficiently quickly then she may instead 
produce a response based upon her own perspective. It is easy to see how this might 
occur under the time pressures of a laboratory task, but importantly the same 
pressures are equally apparent in fast-moving communication and other social 
situations. In this context it is noteworthy that German and Hehman (2006) found that 
adults’ egocentrism on a belief-desire reasoning task was predicted by a measure of 
their processing speed as well as inhibitory control. Thus, age-related improvements 
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in speed of processing are a factor worth exploring as a source of age-related 
reduction in egocentrism.   
In conclusion, the present study revealed for the first time that 8- and 10-year-
olds’ ability to use information about a speaker’s perspective in communication is 
modulated by the complexity of the speaker’s utterances. Ten-year-olds were found to 
be generally less egocentric than 8-year-olds, yet both age groups were equally 
affected by the complexity of the speaker’s utterances. Our findings suggest that the 
age-related improvement in using theory of mind online is not underpinned by the 
ability to manage complex sentences. Nevertheless, by manipulating factors 
embedded within a communication task, we were able to unveil task demands that 
affect children’s ability to use others’ perspectives. Factors such as the complexity of 
a speaker’s speech clearly correspond to the demand a real communicator faces in 
everyday social situations. Hence the present findings suggest that children will be 
most successful at avoiding egocentrism in communication when the discourse is 
relatively simple, and in particular, if speakers avoid extending utterances beyond the 
critical point at which perspective information must be integrated with their message.  
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Appendix A: complete list of critical instructions 
 
 
High sentence complexity* Low sentence complexity 
Nudge the large balloon one slot down Nudge the large balloon 
Nudge the large present one slot up Nudge the large present 
Nudge the short plant one slot up Nudge the short plant 
Nudge the narrow bottle one slot up Nudge the narrow bottle 
Nudge the narrow cup one slot up Nudge the narrow cup 
Nudge the small ball one slot up Nudge the small ball 
Nudge the short jar one slot down Nudge the short jar 
Nudge the tall lamp one slot down Nudge the tall lamp 
Nudge the tall stool one slot up Nudge the tall stool 
Nudge the thick cushion one slot down Nudge the thick cushion 
Nudge the thick folder one slot down Nudge the thick folder 
Nudge the thin book one slot up Nudge the thin book 
Nudge the thin towel one slot up Nudge the thin towel 
Nudge the wide car one slot down Nudge the wide car 
Nudge the small tin one slot down Nudge the small tin 
Nudge the wide vase one slot down Nudge the wide vase 
 
*The critical sentences only involved up/down directions to avoid err due to 
confusion over left/right. Overall there were an equal number of instructions 
involving each of the 4 possible directional words. 
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Appendix B: response time data 
 
Trials containing egocentric errors (20.4% in 8 year-olds; 15.6% in 10-year-olds) and 
responses slower than 3.5 standard deviations from the overall mean (1.2% in 8 year-
olds; 0.7% in 10-year-olds) were excluded prior to the response time analysis. Just 
one 8-year-old child assigned to the high sentence complexity condition was excluded 
from the response time analysis due to not having any data points left in the 
experimental trials after we applied the aforementioned exclusion criteria. 
 
Table	  1	  Average	  response	  time.	  Numbers	  in	  brackets	  correspond	  to	  one	  standard	  error.	  
8 years 10 years 
Low sentence 
complexity 
High sentence 
complexity 
Low sentence 
complexity 
High sentence 
complexity 
Control Exp Control Exp Control Exp Control Exp 
3559 
(118) 
3664 
(200) 
4295 
(185) 
3972 
(196) 
3097 
(74) 
3379 
(99) 
3913 
(98) 
3921 
(115) 
 
 
